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Unfinished reforms, growing social discontent, and ongoing war with Russia deeply 
destabilize Ukraine. Under such strained conditions, what are the chances of Ukraine’s 
current government, and specifically the presidency of Petro Poroshenko, to survive 
until the end of their elected terms? Regime stability is a condition for the success of 
economic and political modernization and for the termination of the Donbas conflict. 
While the concept of political stability has been theorized from different angles and 
perspectives, regime stability has rarely been studied.  
 
This memo approaches the issue of regime stability empirically, first by defining basic 
regime stability indicators and second by assessing them in two points in time: 2013 and 
2017. The first timeframe corresponds to the third year of the presidency of Viktor 
Yanukovych and the second to the third year of the presidency of Petro Poroshenko. 
This comparison will help uncover important trends in Ukraine as well as the chances of 
Poroshenko finishing his first term and his prospects for being reelected. As 
demonstrated here, both the Yanukovych and Poroshenko administrations during these 
periods featured high instability, with Poroshenko’s being more vulnerable to domestic 
challenges than his predecessor’s. Considering that economic growth is contingent on 
political stability and how closely bound Poroshenko’s regime is to Western support, it 
is important that the West double its efforts to embolden reforms in Ukraine. 
 
Components of Regime Stability   
 
A “regime” is conventionally understood to be the set of players in power (the president 
and the government) while “regime stability” refers to the capacity of the players to 
prevent threatening contingencies arising internally or externally that may lead to its 
downfall. Regime stability is a narrower concept than political stability. While the latter 
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relates to the state and its institutions, the former centers on people who exercise power 
on behalf of the state. 
 
Political scientists do not possess a single instrument for measuring regime stability. 
This is mostly because the threats that democratic and autocratic governments typically 
face are different. These caveats are important when discussing hybrid regimes like 
Ukraine’s. The country has never been either completely democratic or completely 
authoritarian. Since the mid-1990s, Ukraine’s regime has had competitive elections but it 
has always retained deeply entrenched clientelism, corruption, and weak rule of law.  
 
The concept of regime stability adopted here is comprised of five components in two 
groupings: legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness, and vertical and horizontal threats. 
While the first three were developed by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1978) and pertain 
to the breakdown of democratic regimes, the latter two appeared in more recent studies 
about the challenges that autocrats face. 
 
While legitimacy is exhibited by public support of the authorities and hence has a 
quantitative dimension, efficacy (the capacity to find solutions to important problems) 
and effectiveness (the capacity to implement policies with desired ends) are somewhat 
more difficult to measure in quantitative terms. Nonetheless, these three components 
can be exhibited by public attitudes toward the behavior of the ruling regime, such as by 
looking at surveys measuring confidence and support for the president, support for 
reforms initiated by the government, and attitudes to Ukrainian affairs that prompt deep 
public commotion. Responses are averaged and transposed onto a 0-100 percent scale, 
with a threshold of 50 percent or higher indicating legitimacy. Effectiveness prevails 
over ineffectiveness if more than 50 percent of the respondents approve of the 
government’s actions concerning a given sphere of activity. Fulfillment of reforms is by 
far more important than number of reforms; it might seem that a value should be 
included of how much the public knows about government actions, but public 
awareness of governmental policies is not a mandatory measure to judge regime 
effectiveness.  
 
The challenges to the “undemocratic” side of Ukraine’s regime are divided into vertical 
and horizontal threats. For authoritarian and hybrid regimes, a horizontal threat, such as 
defections of top regime associates, is considered to be more important than the danger 
of, say, social protest, which is positioned as a vertical threat. Defections can take 
different forms, from conspiracy with the purpose of a coup to betrayal and escape, thus 
every autocrat tries to maintain the integrity of his or her inner circle by all available 
means. The regime’s capacity to prevent vertical and horizontal threats is contingent 
upon organizational, institutional, and ideological factors, such as the presence or 
absence of a strong party, security apparatus, shared ideology, and external support.  
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Poroshenko does not possess a strong party and his formal powers are limited by 
Ukraine’s constitution. His ascent to power began with a secretive deal with Dmytro 
Firtash, Vitaly Klychko, and Serhiy Liovochkin in Vienna. After becoming president, 
Poroshenko tried to offset his organizational and institutional limits by appointing to 
key state and government positions his business partners and loyalists, including at the 
national bank, the prosecutor’s office, courts, and law-enforcement agencies. He 
compensates for his lack of a powerful party and a truly dominant faction in parliament 
by striking tactical alliances with key players. This is how an informal group of 
decisionmakers—the “strategic septet”—was formed. This alliance, however, is fragile 
because the sole element of its unity is rent extraction. Under limited powers and poor 
legitimacy, the president has to constantly assert his primacy, which entails supporting 
some oligarchs over other oligarchs. Poroshenko’s initial partnerships and then conflicts 
with figures such as Ihor Kolomoisky, Michael Saakashvili, and Lviv Mayor Andriy 
Sadovyi are the most vivid examples of the hidden struggle for power and rents. If 
Poroshenko succeeds in ensuring the loyalty of key oligarchs during the second half of 
his presidency, the horizontal threats can be neutralized. The reaction of Ukrainians, the 
vertical threats, are less predictable. The first two protest movements, in 2004 and 2014, 
were citizen revolts against stolen elections and stolen expectations. There is talk about a 
third major protest now circulating in Ukraine (discussed on and off since 2014) but it 
cannot be determined in advance what specific event will force people out onto the 
streets and how long such a mobilization might last. Russia, of course, will continue to 
meddle in Ukraine, but as time goes by, its influence is becoming less threatening to the 
current regime. 
 
Measuring Regime Stability 
 
How stable is Ukraine’s current regime in comparison to Yanukovych’s? Although the 
referents chosen to evaluate legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness primarily mirror 
public perception of the government, they allow for tracking the dynamics of each 
component and for the comparison of a median value of all dimensions in two points in 
time.  
 
For measuring vertical threats, the focus is on the percentage of those who are not ready 
to protest, as this part of the population would represent a silent segment of support for 
the regime. Difficulties arise with estimating the horizontal threats. As the example of 
Yanukovych confirms, clients can remain united around their patron until an 
unpredictable variable gets in the way. In the case of Yanukovych, it was his (or forced 
by Russia) decision to violently suppress the Euromaidan movement. Therefore, the 
value of this indicator for mid-2013 and mid-2017 is defined at 50 percent (the midpoint 
in the methodology denoting neither for nor against regime destabilization). Table 1 
summarizes the values of each dimension. 
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The Russian factor is not taken into account for two reasons. First, President Vladimir 
Putin failed to overthrow the “Kyiv junta” years after power changed hands in Kyiv. 
Second, the U.S. and EU sanctions have raised the cost of new escalations for the Russian 
side. Russia is thus unlikely to impact Poroshenko’s regime significantly in ways that 
differed from 2013. 
 
Table 1. Regime Stability Values      
 Value in % 
Indicators 2013/2014 
(Yanukovych) 
2016/2017 
(Poroshenko) 
Legitimacy 
Confidence (in the president and government) 31.6 17.4 
Legitimacy 
Support (for the president and government) 42.8 33.8 
Efficacy 
Events are moving in the right direction 
15.4 
(October 2013) 
14.2 
(April, 2016) 
Effectiveness 
Ready to endure some financial difficulties 
43,4  
(May, 2013) 
35 
(December, 2016) 
Effectiveness 
In general, the situation has changed for the better 
6.6  
(December, 2013) 
3.1 
(December, 2016) 
Protest potential 
Ready to participate in various protests 
22 
(November, 2013, prior 
to the Euromaidan)  
48.5 
(December, 2016) 
 
Protest potential 
Not ready to protest 
56 
(November, 2013) 
45.6 
(December, 2016) 
Defection potential 50 50 
Median 37.2 34.4 
 
 
As seen in the table, the values of the first three dimensions, in particular for legitimacy, 
deteriorated significantly. Compared to the third year of Yanukovych’s presidency, 
overall confidence in the new president and government has fallen almost twofold. 
Similarly, the level of support also decreased. Public frustrations provoked by 
occurrences such as “Mr. Petro Incognito’s” multi-million dollar Christmas vacation and 
attendance at the posh Opera Ball in Vienna are indications that the credit given to 
Poroshenko and his team in 2014 has been melting quickly.  
 
By 2016-17, the efficacy and effectiveness indicators shrank by roughly 10 percent, while 
the protest potential value grew. At that time, more Ukrainians expressed their 
willingness to participate in various forms of social protest and fewer were willing to 
abstain. These are obviously subjective responses and they do not necessarily translate 
into a new Euromaidan protest taking place, but the trend is clearly not in the 
government’s favor. 
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The defection potential measure is a real test of loyalty. Although the values are 
neutral here based on the analytical timeframes, it is an important dimension to 
monitor. Defections tend to happen during moments of crisis. It is precisely at such 
moments that the expectations of a patron’s clients regarding the patron’s ability to 
remain in power may change. The more open and transparent the politics are toward a 
leader’s inner circle, the greater support an incumbent enjoys. This is usually the case 
when the unity of the ruling group rests on values (not necessarily democratic ones) 
rather than a thirst for rent extraction. The secretive deals, tactical alliances, and 
intrigues still taking place in Kyiv indicate that Ukraine’s Byzantine style of politics not 
only survived the 2014 revolution but has flourished at Poroshenko’s court. The wisdom 
though, as the experience of Poroshenko’s predecessor suggests, is that clients can 
readily switch loyalties when a patron finds himself in a highly vulnerable situation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This analysis allows for three concluding remarks. First, the dynamics of the indicators 
(excluding defection potential) during the third year of Poroshenko are negative for the 
incumbent. As the median values demonstrate, both the Yanukovych and Poroshenko 
regimes were/are inherently unstable. But Poroshenko’s regime, it turns out, is more 
vulnerable to domestic challenges than Yanukovych’s. Second, the West, and the United 
States in particular, should absorb these gauges and take a more resolute stance toward 
the course of reforms in Ukraine. After all, Poroshenko’s survival is highly dependent on 
Western support (financial loans, military assistance, maintenance of sanctions against 
Russia, etc.). Making reform implementation a prerequisite for continued assistance, the 
West can both help stabilize the regime and make reforms irreversible. The West has an 
opening: it could take the side of the roughly 50 percent of Ukrainians who are 
decidedly pro-reform. Third, economic growth is contingent on political and regime 
stability. Finally, a stable EU/NATO “southeastern flank” would be constructive for the 
European security architecture.  
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